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ABSTRACT
In this paper I suggest a partial reading of Crime and Punishment which draws on the philosophy of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau. I outline the Rousseauan idea of a “return to nature,” and then apply it to the case of Raskolnikov, as 
a means of revealing important commonalities between Rousseau’s and Dostoevsky’s thoughts about society. I 
maintain that a Rousseauan perspective can help us to understand the way in which Crime and Punishment connects 
with Dostoevsky’s social-philosophical concerns, through outlining the mechanics of how the story of Raskolnikov 
can be seen as serving Dostoevsky’s attack on Nihilism and illustrating his positive social ideal, the altruistic 
Christian brotherhood.
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In this paper I suggest a partial reading of Crime and Punishment which draws on the 
philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Specifically, I outline a concept which can be derived 
from Rousseau’s writings, which I call the “return to nature,” and then apply it to the case 
of Raskolnikov, as a means of revealing important commonalities between Rousseau’s and 
Dostoevsky’s thoughts about society. I maintain that a Rousseauan perspective can help us 
to understand the way in which Crime and Punishment connects with Dostoevsky’s social-
philosophical concerns, through outlining the mechanics of how the story of Raskolnikov can 
be seen as serving Dostoevsky’s attack on Nihilism and illustrating his positive social ideal, 
the altruistic Christian brotherhood.
I do not intend to say anything particularly new about either Rousseau or Dostoevsky, 
but merely to point out what I think is an interesting coincidence of their ideas. As well as 
being interesting in itself, this coincidence is surprising because most Dostoevsky scholars, 
as well as Dostoevsky himself, have believed Rousseau and Dostoevsky to be philosophical 
antipodes. This is largely because (as far as social philosophy is concerned) Dostoevsky, 
like most of his contemporaries, could not help but see Rousseau only as a predecessor of 
the French revolution and the radical socialists who Dostoevsky came to see as the greatest 
threat to Russian society and culture—a limited perspective which does not do him much 
justice as a thinker. Unlike Tolstoy, what’s more, Dostoevsky probably never read much 
Rousseau (Fink, 2004: 277, 281), which is reflected in his writings: references to the Genevan 
philosopher are not at all infrequent, but reveal a lack of deep insight into the man and his 
works. In Notes from Underground, to take one example, Rousseau is alluded to twice: on 
the first occasion (Dostoevsky, 2009: 10), the narrator ironically associates the despised “man 
of action,” who is active only through ignorance of the stupidity and groundlessness of his 
actions, with l’homme de la nature et de la vérité (the man of nature and truth), as Rousseau 
is labelled on his tomb in the Panthéon (a fact which Dostoevsky recalls in Winter Notes on 
Summer Impressions (Dostoevsky, 1997: 61)); on the second, he echoes Heine’s opinion 
that in the Confessions Rousseau exaggerated his own faults out of vanity and boastfulness 
(Dostoevsky, 2009: 36). These two references encapsulate Dostoevsky’s image of Rousseau: 
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the naive disciple of “nature” and “truth” who failed to understand either of them in all 
their complexity, and whose views about life and society were consequently misguided and 
pernicious. This is not the place to investigate Dostoevsky’s opinion of Rousseau, however, 
but only to describe one of the ways in which their ideas may be seen to overlap. It seems 
to me that this kind of philosophical comparison should serve as a foundation for further 
research into the history of ideas surrounding these two important figures.
To begin with a generality, we may observe that both Rousseau and Dostoevsky believed 
that good societies could only be made of virtuous individuals who would subordinate their 
personal interests to the interests of society. Though this virtue manifested in different ways 
for the two thinkers, both were concerned fundamentally with altruism and self-sacrifice. 
For Rousseau this ideal was to be realized in devoted citizens modelled on the Spartans and 
Romans (Rousseau, 1979: 40); for Dostoevsky, in altruistic Christians devoted to helping one 
another. This view is stated very clearly in Winter Notes, published three years before Crime 
and Punishment, in which Dostoevsky contrasts his own social ideal of the organic Christian 
brotherhood with the artificial fraternité he attributes to the socialists (Dostoevsky, 1988: 48-
52). Indeed, Dostoevsky’s positive social philosophy (as distinct from his concrete political 
opinions) seems to consist of little more than this utopian vision, wherein the triumph of 
Christian altruism in all individuals leads ineluctably, by means not specifiable in advance, 
to the triumph of peace and harmony in society. My aim here is to outline, with reference 
to Rousseau’s similar ideas, the way in which Crime and Punishment illustrates this social-
philosophical significance of personal virtue, and thereby links up with Dostoevsky’s more 
explicitly social-philosophical works like Winter Notes. I shall firstly summarize the relevant 
aspects of Rousseau’s thought, and then move on to consider Crime and Punishment from 
this perspective. 
According to Rousseau, humans are naturally good but are corrupted by civilization. The 
mechanism by which we are all corrupted is amour-propre, self-love, which for Rousseau is 
truly the root of all evil (e.g. Rousseau, 1987: 64).49 I think amour-propre can best be defined 
as self-esteem which depends on comparisons with other people (cf. Cooper, 1999: 149); thus 
it arises out of civilization when people become culturally sophisticated enough to compete 
with one another in various specialized activities (Rousseau, 1987: 53f.). For example, if the 
only way I can respect and esteem myself as a student is by comparing myself favourably to 
other students and academics, then my self-esteem is a manifestation of amour-propre. It’s 
easy to see how this kind of self-love could (and often does) lead to such negative attitudes 
as envy, vanity, pride, arrogance, contempt, etc., according to whether I deem myself to 
be better or worse than my peers. As we shall see, it also stands in the way of good social 
progress, for it causes us to chase after chimerical ideals—such as Raskolnikov’s ideal of 
Napoleon—which only aggravate our pride and vanity, rather than make us better and more 
virtuous people (e.g. Rousseau, 1979: 268f.). 
Rousseau was concerned with the problem of amour-propre in many different ways, 
and the need to solve it informs all of his philosophical writings—about politics, education, 
morals, religion etc. Here I will focus on the problem insofar as it pertains to individual 
49 It can also give rise to good things, like civic virtue, but only under special circumstances and only if it is 
manipulated in certain ways (Cooper, 1999: 14). For present purposes we can assume that amour-propre is straight-
forwardly bad.
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psychology and morality, which we can call the “problem of the good life”—bearing in mind 
that the “good life” as an individual pursuit is a prerequisite for the good society, and thus, 
for Rousseau as for Dostoevsky, has a decisive social-philosophical significance. Writing of 
Rousseau, Laurence Cooper distinguishes what he calls the “two components of the good 
life,” one of which is negative and the other positive (Cooper, 1999: 30ff.). The negative 
component consists simply in maintaining concord with our natural goodness, which in 
practice means suppressing or controlling amour-propre. It is not an ideal in itself but is 
merely a necessary condition for the positive component. The latter includes “the exercise 
and development of faculties, the broadening of ideas, the ennoblement of sentiment, and the 
elevation of soul” (Cooper, 1999: 31; Rousseau, 1987: 151), which is to say, everything good 
and virtuous of which humans are by nature capable. 
For Rousseau, conscience is the mechanism which allows us to attain this ideal. According 
to Cooper’s analysis (1999: 80ff.), Rousseau’s notion of conscience is extremely broad, and 
in addition to providing ordinary moral guidance, “is to the soul what instinct is to the body” 
(Rousseau, 1979: 286): it provides guidance in all humanly important matters—morality, 
religion, aesthetics etc. In general, its job is to “keep psychic energy from overflowing its 
natural channels” (Cooper, 1999: 100), in other words, to ensure that our faculties develop in 
accordance with our good human nature, as required by the second component of the good 
life. Amour-propre undermines this project because it encourages us to do bad, selfish things; 
more importantly, it is so powerful that it inevitably subordinates everything to the goal of 
its own satisfaction—in the psychological economy, it usurps the administrative role which 
ought to be played by conscience, and so diverts our “psychic energy” from its “natural 
channels.” This is why the negative component of the good life, the suppression or control of 
amour-propre, is necessary for the attainment of the positive: it liberates the conscience and 
empowers it to guide the development of our faculties. Thus the two components together 
produce the best possible development of human nature, a synthesis of natural goodness and 
civilized culture.
The question is then how we are supposed to proceed towards this goal. Ideally we must 
be educated from infancy so that amour-propre never gains a hold on us in the first place. 
However, Rousseau’s book on education, Emile, also contains advice applicable to those 
of us who have already been corrupted by civilization, and therefore cannot benefit from 
its educational program (which is in any case almost entirely impractical and impossible to 
implement on a large scale). This appears mainly in the famous section titled “The Profession 
of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar” (Rousseau, 1979: 266ff.), in which Rousseau describes the 
teachings of an unorthodox clergyman who has managed to succeed, to a large extent, in 
returning to the path described by human nature. Much the same advice is also given directly 
by Rousseau in his Moral Letters (Rousseau, 2006: 175-203). One of the principle teachings 
of the Savoyard Vicar and of the Moral Letters is intellectual humility—recognition of the 
fact that we humans are not able to understand everything we might want to understand with 
our limited human intellects. To attain this humility, the Vicar begins with something like 
a Cartesian method of universal doubt, by which he calls into question everything which, 
in his former intellectual arrogance, he assumed he knew (Rousseau, 1979: 267). Unlike 
Descartes, however, instead of relying on an abstract process of reasoning to rebuild his 
convictions, he relies on his sentiments, which is to say, on the promptings of his conscience, 
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in the broad sense described above. The conscience is not philosophically sophisticated, and 
for this reason Rousseau thinks we should in general remain silent about all the esoteric 
philosophical issues which we cannot easily resolve, and limit ourselves to questions which 
any honest, reasonable person can answer with “what in the simplicity of your heart appears 
to you to be the truth” (Rousseau, 1979: 313). With respect to every issue which actually 
matters to our lives—such as those of morality and religion—he believes that our conscience 
will supply us with a firm intuition of what is right and wrong. For example, on the question 
of whether we have free will, he says “[i]t would be vain to try to use reason to try to destroy 
this sentiment in me. It is stronger than any evidence” (Rousseau, 1979: 272). 
So although Descartes started in the right place, by doubting everything he could possibly 
doubt and thereby abandoning his prejudices, he ended up embroiled again in metaphysical 
speculation (Rousseau, 2006: 186). His system is an example of “proud philosophy” because, 
contrary to Descartes’ professed intention, it develops into regions of thought which no-one 
can confidently navigate. It thus represents a refusal to acknowledge the natural limitations 
of the human intellect. Only a truly humble thinker like the Savoyard Vicar, whose reasoning 
never proceeds without the approval of his conscience, will remain within the bounds of what 
is determined by human nature to be good and useful for the cultivation of ourselves, and, 
therefore, the cultivation of society. 
Thus does Rousseau think we can come as close as possible to fulfilling the requirements 
of the good life. Like the naturally educated Emile, we could in this way be capable of real 
social virtue and citizenship.50 The state of doubt the Vicar begins with, in which he humbles 
himself in the awareness of his own limitations and trusts himself to the sentiments of his 
conscience, is the means by which he fulfils the negative component of the good life, and 
this what I will call the return to nature. I will now move on to describe the way in which I 
think Dostoevsky illustrates ideas very much like these in Crime and Punishment. Again, I’m 
not suggesting that Dostoevsky was directly influenced by Rousseau, or attempting to trace 
any indirect influence that may have occurred (Rousseau’s thought was certainly in the air 
Dostoevsky breathed), but only that Dostoevsky’s ideas are strikingly similar to Rousseau’s.
Throughout the novel, Raskolnikov is evidently dominated by amour-propre in the 
form of extreme pride. Pride deriving from amour-propre is pride which depends on one’s 
standing relative to other people, but only such people as one respects. For Raskolnikov, 
there is one person in particular who he respects and who his pride therefore depends on, 
and that is Napoleon Bonaparte. Thus he doesn’t mind whether common folk laugh at him 
as he rambles half-delirious around the streets in his outmoded top hat. Raskolnikov’s self-
respect demands only that he can, like Napoleon, trample over ordinary people in the pursuit 
of his grand designs; and this is why, as he admits later, he commits the murder: in order to 
test the hypothesis of his greatness, to see whether he really can compare favourably to the 
übermensch Napoleon (Dostoevsky, 2003: 499). 
Consequently, Raskolnikov’s pride stifles and usurps the role of his conscience in 
accordance with Rousseau’s predictions. The need to satisfy his pride causes him, firstly, 
50 Except that Emile doesn’t really become a citizen, because there is no nation in the modern world worth 
serving (Rousseau, 1979: 40)—there are too few people capable of citizenship. Thus he and the Savoyard Vicar must 
both, in their own ways, make do with being good to other people and fulfilling their duties to society in the limited 
capacity of private individuals (Rousseau, 1979: 265, 473).
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to unconsciously formulate the murder as a test of his greatness; and secondly, in the form 
of “proud philosophy,” to consciously rationalize the crime in terms of popular Nihilist 
utilitarianism. At the same time, his reliance on these ethical doctrines prevents him from 
hearing the voice of his conscience, which would otherwise have stopped him from acting. 
His crime was never sanctioned by his conscience; he is so far removed from it, however, that 
he mistakes the conclusions of his intellect for the approval of his conscience. This is why he 
can honestly say, like Svidrigailov (Dostoevsky, 2003: 337, 348), that his conscience is clear, 
and that he can only perceive his crime as a stupid mistake and not as a moral transgression 
(Dostoevsky, 2003: 647). Thus Dostoevsky illustrates the way in which ethical theories 
masquerade as real morality, and take the place of Raskolnikov’s conscience in determining 
his moral attitudes. As Joseph Frank remarks: “It is not only that his ideas run counter to the 
instinctive promptings of his moral-emotive sensibility; these ideas momentarily transform 
him into someone for whom moral conscience ceases to operate as part of his personality” 
(Frank, 1995: 107). 
Raskolnikov is redeemed, ultimately, by something like a return to nature in the manner of 
the Savoyard Vicar. Just like the Vicar, he goes through a period of doubt in which his beliefs 
are called into question. In fact, this period occupies the whole novel until the Epilogue. 
To begin with, his Nihilist ethical theories are continually undermined by his own acts of 
kindness (Frank, 1995: 106f.)—he is moved in spite of them to assist the Marmeladov family 
(Dostoevsky, 2003: 34), as well as the young woman being pursued by a sexual predator 
(Dostoevsky, 2003: 57ff.). Then he is forced, as a result of his failure maintain composure 
after the murder, to admit that he is not a “great man” like Napoleon. All of this points to a 
basic incompatibility between his theories and the reality of human nature. Only the need to 
satisfy his amour-propre keeps him from realising this fact straight away, and keeps alive 
the conflict between his conscience and his proud intellect. And like the Vicar, Raskolnikov 
finally attains humility, when in the Epilogue he abandons his whole system of thought and 
begins to trust his feelings instead of his thoughts (Dostoevsky, 2003: 655f.). This is what 
I call his return to nature. Afterwards, he loses his sense of shame, which was born of his 
wounded pride, and begins to love Sonya according to the natural inclinations of his heart. 
Interestingly, the immediate catalyst for this transformation, which is normally considered 
only in terms of its purely religious significance, is literally nature—the natural environment. 
He enjoys a moment of solitude outside the prison fortress, before starting work, looking out 
over the river and the steppe (Dostoevsky, 2003: 654):
Over there, in the boundless steppe awash with sunlight, he could see the yurts of the 
nomad tribesmen like barely perceptible black dots. Over there was freedom, over there lived 
other people, quite different from those who lived here, over there time itself seemed to have 
stopped, as though the days of Abraham and his flocks had never passed. 
The significance of the scene is twofold. Firstly, the reference to “the days of Abraham” 
lends it a religious aspect, and reveals that Raskolnikov is currently preoccupied with spiritual 
matters. Secondly, however, we should note that the nomads themselves are not Christians; 
nor is the environment overtly religious—Raskolnikov is not in a church but surrounded by 
the steppe. In fact, the nomads belong to the stage of human cultural development which 
Rousseau thought was the best so far attained on earth, namely, the “savage” stage, half 
way between the pure state of nature and our corrupt civilization. Rousseau frequently 
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glorified the lives of savage peoples as a means of condemning the excesses of modern 
civilization (e.g. in the two Discourses—Rousseau, 1987: 1-109). The Kirghiz nomads and 
their natural surroundings seem to have precisely this kind of significance for Raskolnikov 
and Dostoevsky. They represent humanity without civilization, living freely, simply and 
peacefully on the “boundless steppe awash with sunlight,” reflecting in concrete reality the 
new state of Raskolnikov’s soul: although he is not yet a Christian, he is much closer than 
he was before, because, like the nomads, he has attained a morally neutral middle ground 
between the corruption of the Nihilists and the pious religiosity of Sonya and his fellow 
convicts.
Dostoevsky believed that the Russian people, in spite of their rough exterior, were the 
last bastion of the “true image of Christ,” and thus held the key to a moral resurrection of 
the civilized world, beginning with educated Russians like Raskolnikov (a central theme in 
the journalistic writings, e.g. Dostoevsky, 1964: 79). It will not here be possible to enter into 
the similarities and differences between Dostoevsky’s and Rousseau’s religious ideas; at the 
very least, however, we can say that both of them venerated Christ as a moral ideal. Rousseau 
thought that the teachings of the Gospels were “in perfect harmony with the conclusions of 
reason and nature” (Grimsley, 1968: 71), in other words, with the dictates of conscience. 
The Savoyard Vicar derives from the sentiments of his conscience a “natural religion” 
which includes (deistic) belief in God, immortality, and basic Christian morality of the kind 
espoused by Christ himself. (Note that Rousseau should in this respect be distinguished from 
those Enlightenment deists who derived their natural religion from pure reason, rather than 
reason informed by sentiment.) So from a Rousseauan perspective, we can say that having 
accomplished a return to nature, Raskolnikov is now in a position to perceive, using his 
conscience, the Christian moral ideal carried by Sonya and the pious convicts; thus the novel 
ends with his contemplating the possibility of sharing Sonya’s convictions. He can now 
begin to fulfil the positive component of the good life by realising anew the potential of his 
intellect and imagination, but this time with humility and in accordance with his conscience, 
and therefore with the example of Christ as a new moral foundation. And, returning to our 
original social-philosophical concerns, he can now perceive Christian brotherhood as an 
ideal and begin to strive towards it in practice.
In fact, the appellation “return to nature” is lent further justification by the fact that, in 
Winter Notes, Dostoevsky writes that the ideal of brotherhood “is a law of nature; normally 
man tends towards this” (Dostoevsky, 1988: 49). The badly civilized West has completely lost 
this element of human nature. But in Russia, the natural disposition for brotherhood has been 
preserved along with Orthodox Christianity—and if Russia is not yet a perfect brotherhood 
this is because the educated classes have temporarily, as a result of Peter’s Westernizing 
reforms, abandoned and forgotten this part of their heritage. By morally reuniting with the 
Russian people, they can recover it and put it into practice. But first it is necessary to perceive 
the ideal of brotherhood as an ideal, which is not easy for progressively educated Russians 
like Raskolnikov. To say nothing of the humble self-abnegation needed to put oneself, as 
Sonya does, wholly at the service of one’s fellows, it takes great intellectual humility merely 
to discard one’s theories of right and wrong and trust one’s conscience instead; for this ideal is 
not a matter of reasoning and calculations of advantage, but is on the contrary, as Dostoevsky 
writes in Winter Notes, a “humiliation of reason [razum]” (Dostoevsky, 1988: 50). It requires 
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of each individual a return to nature by which the conscience is liberated.
Although it has not been possible for me to pursue the comparison very far here, I think 
it is clear that on the matters discussed above Dostoevsky did not think so differently from 
Rousseau, in spite of the general consensus that “Dostoevsky despised him” (Fink, 2004: 
275). Looking to the broader contexts of their works, we can say that Dostoevsky condemned 
the Nihilist doctrines of the day in just the same way as Rousseau condemned the “proud 
philosophy” of the Enlightenment: both of them fought against the subordination of morality 
to science and intellectualist philosophy, and both urged their contemporaries not to rely too 
heavily on abstract reasoning when dealing with matters of basic human importance. And 
they agreed that if these considerations could be observed in practice, by each individual, 
human society could be radically improved. Thus, for Dostoevsky, Raskolnikov’s personal 
regeneration is at the same time a reconciliation with Sonya. Raskolnikov thereby illustrates 
Dostoevsky’s ideal of a moral reunification with the Russian people, who had not been 
affected by the various theories circulating among the educated classes, and had therefore, 
in a sense, preserved the conscience of the nation against the Westernizing developments of 
the Petersburg period. In contrast, Rousseau did not have such faith in any existing people; 
but Dostoevsky’s ideal of a morally unified Russia is to my mind a broadly Rousseauan one.
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